This book takes a phenomenological approach to feminist issues in medical ethics: AIDS and reproductive technology.

The relevance of Sartre's theory of "the look" for feminist philosophy is evaluated through juxtaposition of his analysis with images of women's oppression in Rich's early poetry. A theory of liberation that recognizes the existential dimensions of women's situations is presented. Following traces of feminist vision in Rich's recent work challenges the category of "woman" which lies at the root of the sexism.

A leading critic of the disruptive force of technology in education, Bernard Stiegler saw the counter-effects of artificial intelligence in undermining human agency, autonomy and individuality, rendering the role of education ever more critical. Stiegler believes that our goal is not to abandon technology but to focus our attention on its power and direction in a hypercapitalist economy. While he did not foresee the emergence of generative artificial intelligence (GAI), its rapid acceleration raises important issues for his notion of digital (...) writing as a pharmakon. In this essay, we examine Stiegler’s view on intelligence, digital writing, technological memory, and neuropower, focusing specifically on his Shanghai lecture and Nanjing Lectures. We compare Stiegler with Catherine Malabou, who examines the nature of intelligence primarily through the lens of neuroscience. We argue that Malabou’s view of neuroplasticity in human and artificial brains, and her critique of techno-narcissism in the control over technology, add an important dimension to Stiegler’s political critique of education. Finally, we examine how best to construe AI as part of a hyper-materialist epistemology that Stiegler espouses in the conclusion of his Nanjing Lectures, to bring about neganthropic knowledge through a therapeutics of care. (shrink)

To what extent are women obliged to be child-bearers? If reproductive technology could offer some form of ectogenesis, would feminists regard it as a liberating reproductive option? Three lines of reproductive rights arguments currently used by feminists are applied to ectogenesis. Each fails to provide strong grounds for prohibiting it. Yet, there are several ways in which ectogenesis could contribute to women's oppression, in particular, if it were used to undermine abortion rights, reinforce traditional views of fertility, increase fetal rights (...) in pregnancy, and perpetuate the unequal distribution of scarce medical resources. A re-thinking of women's relationship to pregnancy is needed in order to challenge ectogenetic research. (shrink)

While Sartre was committed to liberation struggles around the globe, his writing never directly addressed the oppression of women. Yet there is compatibility between his central ideas and feminist beliefs. In this first feminist collection on Sartre, philosophers reassess the merits of Sartre's radical philosophy of freedom for feminist theory.

In two recent works, Intellectuals and Power and General Theory of Victims, François Laruelle offers a critique of the public intellectual, including Jean-Paul Sartre, claiming such intellectuals have a disregard for victims of crimes against humanity. Laruelle insists that the victim has been left out of philosophy and displaced by an abstract pursuit of justice. He offers a non- philosophical approach that reverses the victim/intellectual dyad and calls for compassionate insurrection. In this paper, we probe Laruelle's critique of the committed (...) intellectual's obligations to victims, specifically, through an examination of Sartre's "A Plea for Intellectuals." We hope to show the value of Laruelle's theory on victims, crime and power for imagining future-oriented intellectuals. (shrink)

Higher education has not been spared from the effects of the disruptive aspects of technology. MOOCs, teach bots, virtual learning platforms, and Wikipedia are among technics marking a digi...

Events surrounding the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States raise compelling moral questions about the effects of war and globalization on children in many parts of the world. This paper adopts Sartre's notion of freedom, particularly its connection with materiality and intersubjectivity, to assess the moral responsibility that we have as a global community toward our most vulnerable members. We conclude by examining important first steps that should be taken to address the plight of children.

Doping is an important issue in competitive sports and poses potentially irreversible consequences to athletes. Understanding the psychological process underlying antecedents and doping intention will inform policy and prevention. This study aimed to test the psychosocial mechanisms of doping in adolescent athletes using an integrated model. In this model, we examined the associations of perceived motivational climate, moral variables, and attitudinal variables with doping intention. We further investigated whether the moral variables mediated the relationship between perceived motivational climate and doping (...) intention. A cross-sectional survey was employed in the present study. Six hundred and fifteen Chinese adolescent athletes completed questionnaires measuring demographic information and the variables mentioned previously. Structural equation modeling showed that the hypothesized model had a good fit and explained 64.1% of the variance in doping intention. Task-involving motivational climate indicated both directly and indirectly negative associations with doping intention via sportspersonship. The ego-involving motivational climate was positively associated with doping intention via moral disengagement. Among perceived pros/cons of doping and perceived cons of not doping, both perceived cons of doping and cons of not doping were positively associated with doping intention with a small effect size. This study confirmed the roles of tasking- and ego-involving motivational climates, moral variables, and attitudinal variables on doping intention. These research findings may provide new insights for the future of intention-based doping prevention programmes. (shrink)

ObjectiveThis systematic review aims to make a mixed comparison of interventions for kinesiophobia and individuals with musculoskeletal pain.MethodsA comprehensive search strategy was conducted in the database of PubMed, MEDLINE, and Web of Science with the inclusion criteria: randomized controlled design; patients with musculoskeletal pain as participants; treatments protocols of kinesiophobia as interventions or comparisons; the score of Tampa Scale Kinesiophobia as outcome measures. A network meta-analysis was used to synthesize the data after checking the model consistency. The risk of bias (...) was assessed by the Cochrane Collaboration Risk of Bias Assessment Tool.ResultsThirty-one studies were included in this review after a comprehensive search strategy with a low risk of bias and good consistency. According to the results of the network meta-analysis, a multi-modal treatment protocol had the highest probability to become the best choice in dealing with kinesiophobia caused by musculoskeletal pain, whereas psychological treatment protocols also showed a potentially positive effect on musculoskeletal pain-induced kinesiophobia.ConclusionMulti-modal protocols could be recommended as the preferred option when dealing with kinesiophobia caused by musculoskeletal pain. However, it is still worth mentioning that there are also potentially positive therapeutic effects of psychological interventions. Since the concept of kinesiophobia is based on the fear-avoidance model, the psychological mechanism should be paid enough attention to during treatment.Registration NumberCRD42021286450. (shrink)

The sixteen essays in Gender Struggles address a wide range of issues in gender struggles, from the more familiar ones that, for the last thirty years, have been the mainstay of feminist scholarship, such as motherhood, beauty, and sexual violence, to new topics inspired by post-industrialization and multiculturalism, such as the welfare state, cyberspace, hate speech, and queer politics, and finally to topics that traditionally have not been seen as appropriate subjects for philosophizing, such as adoption, care work, and the (...) home. (shrink)

Is shame social? Is it superficial? Is it a morally problematic emotion? Researchers in disciplines as different as psychology, philosophy, and anthropology have thought so. But what is the nature of shame and why are claims regarding its social nature and moral standing interesting and important? Do they tell us anything worthwhile about the value of shame and its potential legal and political applications? -/- In this book, Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni propose an original philosophical account (...) of shame aimed at answering these questions. The book begins with a detailed examination of the evidence and arguments that are taken to support what they call the two dogmas about shame: its alleged social nature and its morally dubious character. Their analysis is conducted against the backdrop of a novel account of shame and ultimately leads to the rejection of these two dogmas. On this account, shame involves a specific form of negative evaluation that the subject takes towards herself: a verdict of incapacity with regard to values to which she is attached. One central virtue of the account resides in the subtle manner it clarifies the ways in which the subject's identity is at stake in shame, thus shedding light on many aspects of this complex emotion and allowing for a sophisticated understanding of its moral significance. -/- This philosophical account of shame engages with all the current debates on shame as they are conducted within disciplines as varied as ethics, moral, experimental, developmental and evolutionary psychology, anthropology, legal studies, feminist studies, politics and public polic. (shrink)

In this paper, we distinguish two versions of Curry's paradox: c-Curry, the standard conditional-Curry paradox, and v-Curry, a validity-involving version of Curry's paradox that isn’t automatically solved by solving c-curry. A unified treatment of curry paradox thus calls for a unified treatment of both c-Curry and v-Curry. If, as is often thought, c-Curry paradox is to be solved via non-classical logic, then v-Curry may require a lesson about the structure—indeed, the substructure—of the validity relation itself.

We reformulate, in the context of continuous logic, an oscillation theorem proved by G. Hjorth and give a proof of the theorem in that setting which is similar to, but simpler than, Hjorth's original one. The point of view presented here clarifies the relation between Hjorth's theorem and first-order logic.

Abstract The content of an emotion, unlike the content of a perception, is directly dependent on the motivational set of the subject experiencing the emotion. Given the instability of this motivational set, it might be thought that there is no sense in which emotions can be said to pick up information about the environment in the same way that perception does. Whereas it is admitted that perception tracks for us what is the case in the environment, no such tracking relation, (...) it is argued, holds between one's emotions and what they are about. It is to this worry – that the construal of the emotions as perceptions inevitably raises – that this paper tries to respond. In this paper, I suggest that when it is realized that one dimension of perception itself is directly dependent on the perceiver's perspective on her environment, then emotion, which is also essentially perspectival in this sense, bears the comparison with perception very well. After having clarified the nature and the role that perspective plays in perception, I argue that, in the case of emotions, the same perspectival role can be played by agents’ long-standing evaluative tendencies and character traits. The resulting conception of emotion as perception is then tested against possible objections. (shrink)

While it is generally believed that justification is a fallible guide to the truth, there might be interesting exceptions to this general rule. In recent work on bridge-principles, an increasing number of authors have argued that truths about what a subject ought to do are truths we stand in some privileged epistemic relation to and that our justified normative beliefs are beliefs that will not lead us astray. If these bridge-principles hold, it suggests that justification might play an interesting role (...) in our normative theories. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, a value that's notoriously difficult to understand if we think of justification as but a fallible means to a desired end. We will argue that these bridge-principles will be incredibly difficult to defend. While we do not think that normative facts necessarily stand in any interesting relationship to our justified beliefs about them, there might well be a way of defending the idea that our justified beliefs about what to do won't lead us astray. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, but this way of thinking about justification and its value comes with costs few would be willing to pay. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

Julien Deonna et Fabrice Teroni Cet article explore l’intuition hédoniste convaincante selon laquelle les émotions affectent le bonheur parce qu’elles sont des états de plaisir et de déplaisir. La discussion s’intéresse à deux contraintes sur une version plausible de l’hédonisme et explique quels récits des émotions satisfont ces contraintes. La section 1 s’articule autour de la contrainte de non-aliénation : les constituants du bonheur d’un sujet doivent l’engager. Nous soutenons que l’intuition selon laquelle les émotions ont une valeur prudentielle (...) présuppose que les émotions sont des formes d’engagement, une condition que seules certaines conceptions des émotions satisfont. La section 2 est centrée sur la contrainte de l’unité: si nous reconnaissons une grande variété de (dé)plaisirs, nous devons encore comprendre ce qui en fait des (dé)plaisirs. Concevoir les émotions comme des formes d’engagement, soutenons-nous, permet de résoudre les difficultés concernant la variété et l’unité des (dé)plaisirs qui pèsent sur l’hédonisme traditionnel. Dans la section 3, nous défendons la forme d’hédonisme affectif qui se dégage de ce qui précède. Nous soutenons que cette approche peut être étendue des émotions à d’autres états affectifs et que le rôle central que nous donnons aux tendances à l’action dans notre conception de l’affectivité ne remet pas en question l’idée selon laquelle les émotions contribuent au bonheur en raison de leur valeur hédonique. (shrink)

Deflationists argue that ‘true’ is merely a logico-linguistic device for expressing blind ascriptions and infinite generalisations. For this reason, some authors have argued that deflationary truth must be conservative, i.e. that a deflationary theory of truth for a theory S must not entail sentences in S’s language that are not already entailed by S. However, it has been forcefully argued that any adequate theory of truth for S must be non-conservative and that, for this reason, truth cannot be deflationary :493–521, (...) 1998; Ketland in Mind 108:69–94, 1999). We consider two defences of conservative deflationism, respectively proposed by Waxman :429–463, 2017) and Tennant :551–582, 2002), and argue that they are both unsuccessful. In Waxman’s hands, deflationists are committed either to a non-purely expressive notion of truth, or to a conception of mathematics that does not allow them to justifiably exclude non-conservative theories of truth. Tennant’s conservative deflationism fares no better: if deflationist truth must be conservative over arithmetic, it can be shown to collapse into a non-conservative variety of deflationism. (shrink)

Since Saul Kripke’s influential work in the 1970s, the revisionary approach to semantic paradox—the idea that semantic paradoxes must be solved by weakening classical logic—has been increasingly popular. In this paper, we present a new revenge argument to the effect that the main revisionary approaches breed new paradoxes that they are unable to block.

Based on hierarchical classification and logistic regression of early US and French COVID-19 clinical trials we show that despite the registration of a large number of trials, only a minority had characteristics usually associated with providing robust and relevant evidence.

Erich Przywara admits to have developed his idea of a “metaphysics of creature” in confrontation with M. Heidegger’s thinking. We will show how the Jesuit reading of the latter is based on the roots of Heideggerian thought in the discussions of the 1920s around the nature of Kantism. Przywara tries to account for these debates from the tensions existing in the very approach of the philosopher of Königsberg. These will give rise to two ways of interpretation, that Przywara schematises under (...) the traits of a “metaphysics of finitude,” as represented by M. Heidegger, and a “metaphysics of infinity,” in particular with E. Herrigel. According to Przywara, it is from the dialectic between these two paths that the perspective of the analogia entis as metaphysics of creature must arise. (shrink)

In this article, I side with those who argue that the debate about the definition of “disease” should be reoriented from the question “what is disease” to the question of what it should be. However, I ground my argument on the rejection of the naturalist approach to define disease and the adoption of a normativist approach, according to which the concept of disease is normative and value-laden. Based on this normativist approach, I defend two main theses: (1) that conceptual analysis (...) is not the right method to define disease and that conceptual engineering should be the preferred method and (2) that the method of conceptual engineering should be implemented following the principles of Alexandrova’s account of social objectivity in the context of the definition of disease. (shrink)

Taking our lead from Solomon’s emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, we review the history of repeated attempts to make this object disappear. We adduce evidence suggesting that in the case of James and Schachter, the intentional object got lost unintentionally. By contrast, modern constructivists seem quite determined to deny the centrality of the intentional object in accounting for the occurrence of emotions. Griffiths, however, downplays the role objects have in emotion noting that these do not (...) qualify as intentional. We argue that these disappearing acts, deliberate or not, generate fruitless debate and add little to the advancement of our understanding of emotion as an adaptive mechanism to cope with events that are relevant to an organism’s life. (shrink)

Nous n'aimons guère le spirituel républicain. Un spectre, dira-t-on, vestige de gloires révolues, épouvantail obsolète d'un imaginaire laïque passablement décharné. Forgé dans l'atelier conceptuel de la Révolution française, irriguant le dialogue de la philosophie et des sciences sociales naissantes, le problème du gouvernement des esprits est le point névralgique du XIXe siècle. Et telle est la distance qui nous sépare d'auteurs apparemment aussi hétérogènes que Comte, Michelet, Tocqueville ou Pierre Leroux : rendre effective la liberté des modernes suppose d'abord d'affronter (...) l'énigme du pouvoir spirituel. Heureux émancipés ou mélancoliques vitupérants, nous sommes les héritiers d'une sacralité républicaine qui fut conjointement cernée de tragique et ourlée d'espoirs. Ce livre retrace l'histoire d'une contrariété. (shrink)

Jacques Julien Pris entre ces manifestations de folie collective, en ces temps de détresse que furent le nazisme et le stalinisme, ébranlé par sa propre condition mentale, le poète Paul Celan veut faire entendre une voix qui s’élève « contre ». Afin de faire sentir cette opposition sans quartier, il la porte au coeur même de la langue allemande et de l’art poétique. Nous allons chercher à entendre la singularité de cette voix dans ses expressions qui nous sont à (...) la fois proches et lointaines, cheminant avec le poète dans les sentiers de ses poèmes, dans une sorte d’accompagnement fraternel et respectueux. (shrink)

We cast doubts on the suggestion, recently made by Graham Priest, that glut theorists may express disagreement with the assertion of A by denying A. We show that, if denial is to serve as a means to express disagreement, it must be exclusive, in the sense of being correct only if what is denied is false only. Hence, it can’t be expressed in the glut theorist’s language, essentially for the same reasons why Boolean negation can’t be expressed in such a (...) language either. We then turn to an alternative proposal, recently defended by Beall (in Analysis 73(3):438–445, 2013; Rev Symb Log, 2014), for expressing truth and falsity only, and hence disagreement. According to this, the exclusive semantic status of A, that A is either true or false only, can be conveyed by adding to one’s theory a shrieking rule of the form A & ~A |- \bot, where \bot entails triviality. We argue, however, that the proposal doesn’t work either. The upshot is that glut theorists face a dilemma: they can either express denial, or disagreement, but not both. Along the way, we offer a bilateral logic of exclusive denial for glut theorists—an extension of the logic commonly called LP. (shrink)

We consider two versions of truth as grounded in verification procedures: Dummett's notion of proof as an effective way to establish the truth of a statement and Hintikka's GTS notion of truth as given by the existence of a winning strategy for the game associated with a statement. Hintikka has argued that the two notions should be effective and that one should thus restrict one's attention to recursive winning strategies. In the context of arithmetic, we show that the two notions (...) do not coincide: on the one hand, proofs in PA do not yield recursive winning strategies for the associated game; on the other hand, there is no sound and effective proof procedure that captures recursive GTS truths. We then consider a generalized version of Game Theoretical Semantics by introducing games with backward moves. In this setting, a connection is made between proofs and recursive winning strategies. We then apply this distinction between two kinds of verificationist procedures to a recent debate about how we recognize the truth of Gödelian sentences. (shrink)

Within the metaphysics of quantity, the debate rages between Absolutism and Comparativism. In retrospect, Armstrong appears to be an absolutist, for he claims that magnitudes like being 1 kg in mass are intrinsic properties of particulars, in virtue of which relations like being twice as massive as hold. More importantly, his theory is an instance of what I call ‘Radical Absolutism’, for he does not merely argue that relations are grounded in magnitudes, but also tries to explain how they “flow (...) from” the intrinsic features of magnitudes. The goal of the paper is not to support his theory, but to better understand why it fails, and why this must be of concern to contemporary absolutists. (shrink)

In a series of recent papers, Corine Besson argues that dispositionalist accounts of logical knowledge conflict with ordinary reasoning. She cites cases in which, rather than applying a logical principle to deduce certain implications of our antecedent beliefs, we revise some of those beliefs in the light of their unpalatable consequences. She argues that such instances of, in Gilbert Harman’s phrase, ‘reasoned change in view’ cannot be accommodated by the dispositionalist approach, and that we would do well to conceive of (...) logical knowledge as a species of propositional knowledge instead. In this paper, we propose a dispositional account that is more general than the one Besson considers, viz. one that does not merely apply to beliefs, and claim that dispositionalists have the resources to account for reasoned change in view. We then raise what we take to be more serious challenges for the dispositionalist view, and sketch some lines of response dispositionalists might offer. (shrink)

A scientific mathematical law is causal if and only if it is a process law that contains a time derivative. This is the intrinsic criterion for causal laws we propose. A process is a space-time line along which some properties are conserved or vary. A process law contains a time variable, but only process laws that contain a time derivative are causal laws. An effect is identified with what corresponds to a time derivative of some property or magnitude in a (...) process law, whereas the other terms correspond to the cause(s). According to our criterion, causes are simultaneous with their effects and causality has no temporal direction. Several examples from natural and social disciplines support the applicability of our criterion to all scientific laws. Various objections to our proposal are presented and refuted. The merits our intrinsic theory of causality vis-à-vis the Salmon–Dowe conserved quantity theory are discussed. (shrink)

Anne-Marie Gagné-Julien et Pierre-Olivier Méthot Durant les deux dernières décennies, plusieurs questions classiques de la philosophie de la médecine et de la psychiatrie ont connu un renouvellement. Des angles de recherche jusqu’alors peu explorés font désormais l’objet de vifs débats, et les questions traditionnelles ont été réinterprétées à la lumière de ces nouveaux développements. En examinant ces récents thèmes grâce aux contributions de chercheur.e.s francophones, ce dossier vise à nourrir la progression de cette « nouvelle » philosophie de la (...) médecine et de la psychiatrie, à apporter un éclairage inédit sur certains de ses domaines et de ses objets encore méconnus de même que sur ses courants et ses problématiques émergents, et ainsi à faire avancer des débats classiques sous des angles nouveaux. (shrink)

Julien Tricard tackles the abductive solution to the problem of induction. In order to best explain the regularities that can be observed in nature, should one assume that they necessarily result from natural laws, without which they would be improbable cosmic coincidences? By examining David Armstrong's and John Foster's versions of this inference, Julien Tricard shows that it is based on the confusion of two incompatible concepts of “regularity”. From this he derives a conception of induction that is (...) neither the empiricists’ factual generalization, nor the abduction of nomic necessities from observed regularities, but the operation of constituting particular facts as regular instances of laws. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:One recent body of work has concerned medicalization and how it can create epistemic injustice. It focuses on medicalization as a hermeneutical process that shapes the conceptual framework(s) we use to refer to some conditions/experiences. In parallel, some scholars with lived experience of madness have started to explore the epistemic harms suffered by the Mad community. Building on this, I argue that the process of medicalization in psychiatry affects the Mad community in a specific way that has been overlooked in (...) the literature on medicalization and epistemic injustice. That is, medicalization can create what is called "contributory injustice." This form of injustice occurs when marginalized communities have been able to create alternative hermeneutical resources, but these resources are dismissed or discredited by the dominant group. I argue that the emerging field of Mad Studies is a victim of this type of injustice when Mad experiences are unilaterally medicalized. (shrink)

If Sam empathizes with Maria, then it is true of Sam that (1) Sam is aware of Maria's emotion, and (2) Sam ‘feels in tune’ with Maria. On what I call the transparency conception of how they interact when instantiated, I argue that these two conditions are collectively necessary and sufficient for empathy. I first clarify the ‘awareness’ and ‘feeling in tune’ conditions, and go on to examine different candidate models that explain the manner in which these two conditions might (...) come to be concomitantly instantiated in a subject. I dismiss what I call the parallel and oscillation models for not satisfying the transparency condition, i.e. for failing to capture that, if Sam empathizes with Maria, then Sam's own emotional experience towards the object of Maria's emotion has to be mediated by Maria's own emotional experience. I conclude in favour the fusion model as the only model capable of satisfying the transparency condition, and I argue that the suggested proposal illuminates the difference between it and other ways in which we understand the emotions of others. Finally, I expand and clarify the conception of empathy as transparency through responses to obvious objections that the view raises. Key Words: empathy • emotion • philosophy • psychology • simulation. (shrink)